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Abstract  
When multiple individuals contribute to rearing the same oﬀspring, conﬂict is expected to occur over the 
relative amounts invested by each carer. Existing models of biparental care suggest that this conﬂict should 
be resolved by partially compensating for changes by co-investors, but this has yet to be explicitly modeled 
in cooperative breeders over a range of carer numbers. In addition, existing models of biparental and 
cooperative care ignore potential variation in both the relative costs of oﬀspring production to mothers and in 
maternal allocation decisions. If mothers experience particularly high costs during oﬀspring production, this 
might be expected to aﬀect their investment strategies during later oﬀspring care. Here we show using a 
game-theoretical model that a range of investment tactics can result depending on the number of carers and 
the relative costs to the mother of the diﬀerent stages within the breeding attempt. Additional carers result in 
no change in investment by individuals when production costs are low, as mothers can take advantage of the 
greater potential investment by increasing oﬀspring number; however this tactic ultimately results in a 
decrease in care delivered to each oﬀspring. Conversely, when production costs prevent the mother from 
increasing oﬀspring number, our model predicts that other individuals should partially compensate for 
additional carers and hence oﬀspring should each receive a greater amount of care. Our results reinforce the 
importance of considering investment across all stages in a breeding attempt, and provide some explanatory 
power for the variation in investment rules observed across cooperative species. 
Keywords: bi-parental care, cooperative breeding, game theory, incomplete compensation, maternal eﬀects, 
sealed-bid 
  
Introduction 
Whenever an animal invests in a reproductive attempt, the amount invested represents a trade-off between 
the benefits accrued to the current brood of offspring and the costs to the investor in terms of survival and 
future reproductive potential (Williams 1966). In breeding systems where multiple individuals contribute 
jointly to oﬀspring care, carers additionally should beneﬁt when the other(s) contribute a greater share of the 
total investment (Trivers 1972). In such systems, the lifetime ﬁtness consequences for each individual 
investing in a breeding attempt will depend significantly on the amount invested, with the optimum amount 
emerging as a function of the probability of success of the attempt, the individual’s relatedness to the 
oﬀspring, the possibilities of current and future direct ﬁtness gains, and by the behaviour of the other 
partner(s) contributing to care. The predictability of this investment by others, their likely relative 
contributions, and the point during the breeding attempt at which they invest will all inﬂuence an individual’s 
investment decisions. Without understanding these varied inﬂuences on investment behaviour, the causes 
and consequences of caring can easily be misinterpreted, and the adaptive beneﬁt to individuals forming a 
social pair or group to raise oﬀspring will remain obscured.  
Joint contribution to offspring care can arise either through biparental care, where both parents contribute to 
raising offspring, or through cooperative care, where at least one parent and non-parent contribute. 
Biparental and cooperative care systems are fundamentally similar in that they divide offspring care between 
individuals that benefit from caring, but in cooperative systems both the number of carers and their average 
relatedness to each other are typically greater. In both systems the breeding female gains a potential tactical 
advantage in the conflict over care through her ability to choose offspring size and number, but also often 
pays a greater cost because she must invest in offspring before other carers. The extent to which she can 
capitalize on her advantage will depend in part on these personal costs, as well as on the number and 
predictability of additional carers available (Russell & Lummaa 2009). Despite many theoretical analyses of 
investment in oﬀspring, little attention has been given to the eﬀects on carer investment rules of maternal 
tactics prior to the joint rearing period, and likewise the possible effects of multiple and variable numbers of 
carers has remained relatively unexplored. 
Most models of biparental systems (e.g. Houston & Davies 1985; McNamara et al. 1999) suggest that the 
conflict over care should be resolved by each parent investing less than if raising the brood of young alone, 
and by responding to changes in their partner's investment with incomplete (partial) compensation, such that 
a change in investment by one partner (or the presence/absence of a partner) leads to a change by the other of 
smaller magnitude and in the opposite direction (but see Jones et al. 2002; Johnstone & Hinde 2006). This 
prediction has received considerable empirical support (e.g. Bart & Tornes 1989; Raadik et al. 1990; Wright 
& Cuthill 1990; Whittingham et al. 1994; Markman et al. 1995; Royle et al. 2002; Hinde 2005; reviewed in 
Harrison et al. 2009), and recent theoretical work has shown that incomplete compensation should also 
stabilize negotiations involving three carers (Johnstone 2011). However, support for incomplete 
compensation in biparental care is by no means ubiquitous (Johnstone & Hinde 2006; Harrison et al. 2009), 
and empirical studies investigating the effect of additional carers on individual investment levels in 
cooperative systems have found an even wider range of carer investment strategies. These range from carers 
completely compensating for the additional helper, such that there is no net increase in investment by the 
group as a whole (Brown et al. 1978; Legge 2000), through the expected incomplete compensation 
(Hatchwell & Davies 1990; Wright 1998a) to no compensation, where individual investment remains steady 
(Mumme & Koenig 1990; Emlen & Wrege 1991), or even an increase in individual investment (Valencia et 
al. 2006). In addition, within a given species, individuals can show a range of response reactions depending 
on their status (breeder vs. non-breeder) and/or the number of other carers in the group (Hatchwell 1999; 
Clutton-Brock et al. 2004; Gilchrist & Russell 2007; Browning et al. 2012b). This variation in carer 
responses is poorly understood, but has been suggested to reflect variation in the probability of offspring 
starvation: where starvation is likely, partial or no compensation is expected so that additional helpers have 
some positive effect on brood provisioning frequency (Hatchwell 1999). Nevertheless, it is unclear why 
apparent evidence for both complete and no compensation is relatively common in cooperative breeders 
(Cockburn 1998; Heinsohn 2004) when theoretical work generally predicts incomplete compensation. One 
possibility is that complete compensation arises in conjunction with a non-zero relatedness value between 
carers, such that additional individuals can improve the survival of related carers after brood demand is 
satiated. Another possibility is that the level of compensation varies depending on the costs to the breeding 
female of producing offspring, providing she is able to predict the number of potential helpers and adjust 
offspring number accordingly (Russell et al. 2008). To our knowledge, no previous model has explored the 
consequences of tactical investment in offspring production by mothers, or the consequences of having 
variable numbers of other carers on the optimal investment strategies for each individual during offspring 
rearing.  
As with simpler single-stage models of offspring care, when considering the influence of production costs on 
investment behaviour one would expect the precise amounts invested to depend upon the relative costs and 
benefits of care (Chase 1980; Winkler 1987), and these in turn to depend upon the number of offspring in the 
brood (Smith & Härdling 2000). The integration of models of optimal clutch size with those of investment in 
care has been largely overlooked (but see Smith & Härdling 2000), primarily because existing work suggests 
that females should produce a size and number of offspring that maximizes their return per unit investment 
regardless of the total amount invested (Smith & Fretwell 1974; Winkler & Wallin 1987). However this 
conclusion is based on an analysis of the tactics of a single parent, and one cannot assume that investment in 
offspring production and in subsequent care will be independent if other individuals can also contribute. 
Different numbers of offspring will elicit different levels of investment from other carers, and hence the 
individual choosing offspring number can potentially 'manipulate' the investment levels of others. If a 
breeding female is assisted by one or more individuals in raising offspring, and can adjust the number of 
offspring she produces in response to the presence of these helpers (e.g. Russell et al. 2003; Woxvold 2005), 
one must consider the evolution of offspring number and individual investment together in a single model. 
Smith and Härdling (2000) demonstrate the importance of considering this joint evolution and show that it 
can affect the stability of the mating system, however they do not address the specific investment levels or 
strategies that are expected under different cost parameters or numbers of carers. 
The need for further theoretical work on reproductive investment is supported by the lack of consistent 
empirical results showing incomplete compensation (particularly in studies on cooperative breeders), which 
suggest that some underlying assumptions of current models need to be re-evaluated. Primary amongst these 
is that female investment in offspring size and number is independent of the subsequent investment by all 
carers, particularly given the work already linking them (Smith & Härdling 2000). Breeding females occupy 
a unique position in many care systems, as they are often capable of altering initial offspring size and 
number, and the idea that females can tactically invest in offspring in response to the number of carers has 
support from empirical studies (e.g. Davies & Hatchwell 1992; Taborsky et al. 2007; Russell et al. 2007; 
Santos & Macedo 2011; Canestrari et al. 2011). The breeding female also may pay a greater cost than other 
carers, as she invests time and energy producing and caring for young before other carers are able to invest. 
High costs to the breeding female at this initial production stage can have significant effects on her survival 
or later fecundity (Heaney & Monaghan 1995; Visser & Lessells 2001), leading to a trade-off for the female 
between the amount invested in the pre- and post-helper stages. While females are still expected to maximize 
their return per unit investment in offspring care, the number of helpers and relative costs of the two stages 
(pre- vs. post-birth/hatching) will affect how the female should optimally divide her investment. Any 
complete model of investment in offspring must consider both the number of carers and the relative costs of 
these different stages of investment to fully understand the trade-offs involved in breeding, in addition to 
resolving the familiar conflict between individuals over investment. The benefits different carers gain from 
raising the offspring are also critically important when considering investment in a cooperative system. 
The model that we introduce is a game-theoretical model of investment with variable numbers of carers (2-
12) and choice of oﬀspring number by the breeding female. Investment is divided into two stages: in the ﬁrst 
stage (offspring production) the female pays a cost to produce her chosen number of oﬀspring, then in the 
second stage (offspring rearing), she and all other carers invest in oﬀspring care. The relative costs of the two 
stages are modiﬁed to explore the consequences of breeding systems in which oﬀspring production costs are 
dominant compared to those in which rearing costs are dominant, i.e. in which a greater or lesser proportion 
of the costs incurred by the breeding female fall before or after the point at which helpers are able to invest. 
The relative costs of investment between the female and other carers are also manipulated to determine their 
eﬀects on investment. We evaluate our results in terms of the eﬀects of helper number and timing of costs on 
the numbers of oﬀspring produced, the individual investment rules of group members, and the amount of 
care delivered to each oﬀspring.  
 
  
The Model 
Description 
Our aim is to explore the outcome in terms of productivity, total investment per oﬀspring, and response to 
additional carers when the female is able to alter the number of oﬀspring based on the number of other carers 
(hereafter helpers) in the group. For simplicity we assume that the breeding male, if present, has a similar 
payoﬀ function to the helpers (see discussion) and hence can be grouped with them in the model. Our model 
is a sequential game of two steps, similar to that developed by Smith and Härdling (2000). The female ﬁrst 
chooses the number of oﬀspring n, with knowledge of the number of helpers in the group z, and pays a cost 
derived from the number of oﬀspring produced. Following this all carers play a simultaneous game to 
determine their individual investment levels. The choice of level of investment in the second step is assumed 
to be simultaneous and independent by all individuals, a 'sealed-bid' interaction following Houston and 
Davies (1985), rather than a 'negotiation' in which carers repeatedly interact in behavioral time to reach a 
stable investment level (as in McNamara et al. 1999, 2003; Johnstone & Hinde 2006). In general sealed-bid 
and negotiation models generate qualitatively similar results: for analogous models the results from sealed-
bid approaches are reproduced in negotiations where individuals are inflexible in their response to each 
other's bids (McNamara et al. 1999). In our model we used a sealed-bid rather than negotiation approach 
because this allowed us to obtain analytical solutions for all numbers of carers, however individuals are 
assumed to be able to adjust their investment bid in the second step in response to the size of the brood set in 
the first step. 
We first calculate the response of a breeding female and z ‘helpers’, (including the breeding male, if present) 
to a given brood size n. Breeding females choose an amount xf to invest, and simultaneously all helpers 
choose an amount, termed 
i
hx  for the ith individual. The vector of other carer investment amounts is hx where 
1 2 3 1,  ,  ,   ,( ) ,  z zh h h h h hx x x x x
−…=x . Investment in offspring influences their survival and future 
reproduction, and we assume all offspring benefit equally and regardless of the particular individuals 
contributing. The benefit b to the brood of offspring depends on n and the total investment all individuals 
provide totx , where 1   
z i
tot f i hx x x== + ∑  . We assume that there is some constant minimum level of 
investment per offspring xmin below which individual offspring gain no benefit from being helped, such that 
the response of b to investment is a function of /   –tot minx n x . 
We include a constant kb to scale benefit as appropriate with our cost functions. We assume that the first 
derivative of the benefit function (bꞌ) is positive, such that increasing investment leads to increasing benefit 
to the offspring, but that the second derivative (bꞌꞌ) is negative, such that increasing investment leads to 
diminishing returns. Given these assumptions, for illustrative purposes we use a quadratic function that 
yields analytical solutions: 
2min min
tot tot
b
x xb k x x
n n
    = ⋅ − − −           
Reproduction is costly (Williams 1966), as it requires the investment of resources such as time or effort that 
otherwise would have a positive effect on future fitness. The total cost to the female cf depends on the 
number of offspring she produces n, and her investment in rearing the brood xf as well as two constants: the 
relative cost of offspring production kp (which acts on n), and the relative cost of offspring rearing kr (which 
acts on xf). The total cost to the female is calculated from the sum of the costs of the two steps, an approach 
supported by studies demonstrating a trade-off between investment in producing and rearing broods (e.g. 
Heaney and Monaghan 1995). We assume that for all individuals the first derivative of the cost function (cf) 
is positive, such that increasing investment leads to increasing costs, and that the second derivative (cf) is 
also positive, such that costs accelerate with greater investment. Similarly, for the ith other carer the cost 
i
hc  
depends on that individual's investment level 
i
hx  and the relative cost of offspring rearing (ks to allow for 
differences from the female's rearing costs). Unlike the female's cost function it does not depend on n as the 
other carers do not produce offspring themselves. As before, for simplicity we choose a quadratic function 
for both cost functions: 
( )
2 2
2
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Optimization of investment levels in a given brood requires trading off the benefit an individual receives 
from current reproduction against the costs from reducing survival probably or future reproductive success, 
and must also account for the relatedness between the investing individuals. Inclusive payoff functions for 
the female and helpers (respectively wf  and 
i
hw  for the ith helper) are generated by taking the benefit 
individuals receive from helping and subtracting the costs individuals pay as a result of investment by 
themselves and by related individuals (weighted by their relatedness to the focal individual). For simplicity 
we assume that all other carers are equally related to the offspring, and that all individuals receive a benefit 
directly proportional to their relatedness to the brood (rfb or rhb). The breeding female and other carers are 
also all related equally (female-helper rfh, helper-helper rhh). To summarize, the inclusive payoffs are given 
by: 
1
1
z
i
f fb f fh h
i
z
i i i
h hb h hh h
i
w r b c r c
w r b c r c
=
=
= ⋅ − − ⋅
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Solving the model 
At equilibrium, neither the female nor any helper should be able to increase their payoff by altering their 
investment levels. Formally: 
0
i
f h
i
f h
w w
x x
∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂   
There are no differences between helpers aside from their investment decisions, so the same response to 
investment by the rest of the group will be made by all helpers, and at equilibrium 
i
hx  will be identical for all 
i. Solving the above produces rules for xf and 
i
hx  in terms of n and z at equilibrium, which are termed ˆ fx  and 
ˆhx  respectively. 
We can now calculate the optimal strategy for the female to play in the first step. The female should choose a 
value of n such that it maximizes her payoff wf given that 
ˆf fx x=  and ˆ
i
h hx x=  at equilibrium. For 
simplicity we assume that n is large, and thus approximately continuous. Formally: 
0f
w
n
∂
=
∂  
After solving this we have rules for xf , 
i
hx  and n at equilibrium that depend only on helper number z and the 
extrinsically specified parameters. 
 
Comparison of analogous breeding attempts 
From these rules we can plot expected investment levels by females and helpers across a range of carer 
numbers, and substitute them back into the original payoff equations to determine the equilibrium payoff. 
However, although the above results can elucidates the costs of the two stages will affect investment 
decisions (by manipulation of kr and ks versus kp), we need a way of equating the costs of the two stages 
before we can meaningfully examine the effects of different cost parameters on breeding attempts. To do 
this, we consider the simple case of a lone female investing in offspring. 
As before, we calculate the optimal investment levels by maximizing the payoff equation wf, but this time 
ignoring any investment by helpers (z = 0, 
i
hx  = 0). With no individuals other than the female, the game 
simplifies and is functionally single-step; the female must simply maximize her payoff (for this simplified 
case relabeled 
0
fw ) with respect to both her investment 
0
fx  and the brood size 
0n . Formally: 
0 0
0 0 0
f f
f
w w
x n
∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂  
 Figure 1: Contours of equal lone female payoﬀ 0fw  under varying values of production cost kp and 
rearing cost kr. Along these contours, paired values of kp and kr give the same payoﬀ for a female raising 
a brood alone. 
Solving this equation for 
0
fx  and 
0n  generates equilibrium values 
0ˆ fx  and 
0nˆ  which can then be 
substituted into wf0 to yield an equation for female payoff that depends only on the constants of the 
system. Plotting production cost kp against rearing cost kr (Fig. 2.1) then gives us contours of equal 
female fitness that each represent a set of analogous breeding attempts differing only in the 
“balance” between the production and rearing costs. We can now alter kp and kr to produce 
conditions where the breeding attempts are dominated either by production-stage or rearing-stage 
costs, but where the total payoff for the attempts are the same; this allows us to make comparisons 
between the two kinds of breeding attempt under conditions where they are analogous. 
To generate results, we chose three pairs of values for kp and kr that fell along a typical payoff contour. The 
three pairs represent a low, moderate, and high production cost respectively, and correspond to values of kp 
that differ by a factor of five. The values of the other constants (see supplementary material) were chosen 
either for approximation to real cooperative systems (e.g. in the case of relatedness values), or so that the 
resulting numbers of offspring fell within a normal range for a terrestrial vertebrate. Unless otherwise 
specified, we assume that females and helpers have the same cost constant during the rearing stage (kr = ks), 
and that relatedness values are 0.25 between the helpers and offspring, helper and other helpers, and helpers 
and the breeding female. Throughout, 'carers' refers to all individuals including the breeding female, while 
'helpers' refers to every individual except the breeding female. 
 
  
Results 
(i) Productivity 
Females produce more offspring as helper number increases (Fig. 2a). When the majority of costs fall in the 
rearing stage, offspring number and fitness are nearly linearly related to helper number, as helpers are able to 
contribute more effectively to the breeding attempt. In contrast, when the costs at the production stage are 
higher the positive effect on the payoff of having additional helpers plateaus quickly. This effect arises 
because the female rapidly reaches a level of initial investment in offspring that is extremely costly, and so is 
unable to capitalize on the presence of additional helpers by producing more offspring. This limitation on 
offspring production leads to a reduction in the benefit of acquiring additional helpers (to both the breeding 
female and existing helpers) as the number of helpers increases (Fig. 2b). This decrease is far more rapid, 
and the benefit to recruiting more helpers far lower, when production costs are relatively higher than rearing 
costs. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2: Increasing carer number increases oﬀspring number, and more oﬀspring are produced when 
rearing costs are higher than when production costs are higher (a). For both the breeding female and other 
carers, recruiting an additional carer always leads to a greater payoﬀ (b), but this beneﬁt is larger when 
rearing costs are higher than when production costs are higher (the ﬁgure shows the payoﬀ to a helper, 
but the breeding female exhibits the same relationship). Three sets of cost parameters (equivalent for a 
lone female) are displayed: Rearing costs dominant (solid); balanced costs (dashed); production costs 
dominant (dotted). Payoﬀ is expressed in arbitrary units. 
(a) (a) 
(ii) Investment levels 
Investment levels have a more complicated dependence on helper number and the timing of costs. When 
there are few helpers the addition of another helper can lead to 'superadditive' investment, where all carers 
(helpers and breeding female) increase their individual investment in the brood (as in Valencia et al. 2006). 
As the number of helpers increases this positive effect on individual investment decreases, leading first to 'no 
compensation' (all carers maintain their individual investment, as in Wright et al. 1999) and then to 
compensatory care ('load-lightening'; all carers reduce their individual investment) (Fig.3a). The type of care 
received affects the amount of investment per offspring: when it is superadditive each offspring receives less 
investment as more helpers are added, but under compensatory care each receives more (Fig.3b). This 
apparent contradiction, whereby an increase in individual carer investment leads to lower per-offspring 
investment received (and vice-versa) is due to the greater number of offspring produced by the female in the 
production stage. The timing of costs is also crucial, as when rearing costs are dominant superadditive care 
and no compensation appear over a larger range of helper numbers, whereas dominant production costs favor 
compensatory care. In all cases the total amount of investment delivered to the brood by all carers increases 
as the number of carers goes up, but this total is higher when rearing costs are dominant. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3: Additional carers reduce the eﬀort expended by all individuals when production costs are high 
(incomplete compensation), and increase or maintain the eﬀort (superadditive care or no compensation 
respectively) when rearing costs are high (a). In general, increasing carer number leads ultimately to load-
lightening for any set of cost parameters. Individual oﬀspring receive a greater amount of investment 
each when care is compensatory, but when it is superadditive they receive a lesser amount (b). The same 
sets of cost parameters are plotted: Rearing costs dominant (solid); balanced costs (dashed); production 
costs dominant (dotted). Investment is expressed in arbitrary units. 
(b) (a) 
(iii) Variable rearing costs 
We have generally assumed above that rearing costs are the same for identical levels of investment across 
breeding females and helpers. This assumption will often be violated in natural systems, as helpers are 
frequently found to differ from breeders in their foraging ability (e.g. Heinsohn 1991; Clutton-Brock et al. 
2002), and young helpers may be poorer foragers than older helpers (e.g. Heinsohn and Cockburn 1994). 
Breeding females may also pay a unique cost when the offspring are young (but after other individuals are 
able to invest), for example from brooding the young before they can self-regulate their temperature. Taking 
this variation into account, we see that load-lightening by the female starts at larger numbers of helpers the 
greater the cost to helpers relative to the female (Fig. 4a). As expected helpers invest far less when their costs 
are higher, but they too show load-lightening at greater helper numbers when their costs are higher than 
those of the female (Fig. 4b). This relationship is fairly simply explained: the poorer the ability of helpers to 
provide investment, the more helpers are needed to reach the female's constraint on investment at the 
production stage. This of course assumes that the overall 'quality' of the helpers is predictable by the female 
at the time offspring are produced.  
 
  
  
 
Figure 4: Diﬀerences between females and other carers in the cost of investment during the rearing stage 
alter whether compensatory care is expected from the female across diﬀerent numbers of helpers (a). 
Compensatory care begins at smaller helper numbers when helper costs are lower than female costs, and 
the female is able to reduce her investment faster as helper number increases. Investment by other carers 
shows a similar relationship (b), but changing their cost parameter has a stronger eﬀect on their total 
investment. Plots show costs to other carers half those of the breeding female (ks = kr /2) (dashed); equal 
costs (ks = kr) (dot-dashed); other carer costs double those of females (ks = 2kr) (dotted).  
(b) (a) 
Discussion 
Our results suggest that when rearing costs (rather than production costs) are dominant, females are expected 
to produce many offspring to capitalize on the presence of helpers. As the number of other carers in the 
system increases, all individuals will work harder and invest more in the brood both individually and as a 
group (superadditive care). However this increase in investment only partially compensates for the greater 
number of offspring initially produced, such that each individual offspring will have less invested in it than it 
would have had in a smaller brood with fewer helpers. The opposite pattern is predicted when production 
costs are dominant. In this case females still produce more offspring with additional helpers, but to a lesser 
extent. Each additional helper reduces the levels of investment of all carers (load-lightening), and each 
individual offspring has a greater amount invested in it when there are more helpers in the system. 
Whichever stage of costs is dominant, 'no compensation' or 'superadditive care' is more likely to be observed 
when helper costs are greater than female costs. Larger groups of carers are biased towards load-lightening, 
as the female will always eventually be constrained by her initial investment. Our finding that investment 
rules are symptomatic of particular cost parameters may help to explain some of the inconsistency in 
empirical studies of investment, as we would not expect the same investment rules across species that differ 
in factors of breeding biology or life history that restrict flexibility in offspring number, predictability of 
helpers, or the subsequent costs of incubating, provisioning or protecting the offspring until independence. 
Existing analyses (e.g. Houston & Davies 1985) predict that in biparental systems each carer should respond 
to the investment of the other by incompletely compensating, and thus escape part of the costs of care (load-
lightening). This result holds in general for both sealed-bid and negotiation analyses (though see Jones et al. 
2002; McNamara et al. 2003; Johnstone & Hinde 2006), and recent work extending negotiation to three 
individuals suggests it also holds for three carers (Johnstone 2011). Our analysis, however, demonstrates that 
these predictions hold only for a fixed brood size. They are thus relevant when predicting the response of a 
female to experimental removal or manipulation of her mate after offspring have been produced (e.g. Bart & 
Tornes 1989; Raadik et al. 1990; Duckworth 1992; Fetherston et al. 1994; Markman et al. 1995; Itzkowitz et 
al. 2001), but not when comparing (either within or between species) the behaviour of females who can 
anticipate the number of helpers at the time of offspring production. The critical assumptions of our model 
are that individuals show systematic variation and respond to changes in offspring number in behavioral 
time, but these assumptions are supported by recent work showing tactical female investment during 
offspring production according to the number of carers available (Russell et al. 2003; Russell et al. 2007; 
Taborsky et al. 2007; Russell and Lummaa 2009; Canestrari et al. 2011; Santos and Macedo 2011). 
Similarly, examples from both observational studies (Magrath & Elgar 1997) and experiments (Sanz & 
Tinbergen 1999; Komdeur et al. 2002) show that breeding males are capable of responding to greater clutch 
sizes by increasing parental investment.  
Inflexible brood sizes across different numbers of carers can be seen as a special case that occurs when 
production costs to the breeding female are very high, there is a biological constraint, or when it is very 
difficult to predict the amount of future help at the time of offspring production. Inflexible brood sizes lead 
to the female and helpers escaping more of the costs of care as carer number increases, and offspring 
individually doing better; this follows the pattern one would expect if extrapolating from uni- and biparental 
systems. However, when the female is able to modify brood size in response to a predictable number of 
helpers a different pattern of investment can appear. When production costs are cheap relative to those of the 
rearing period, our model suggests that the breeding female should take advantage of the helpers' anticipated 
contributions by producing more offspring (as in Davies & Hatchwell 1992; Russell et al. 2003; Woxvold 
2005), rather than by fully reducing her own level of investment. Under these circumstances, producing a 
larger brood/litter can be viewed as a means of 'manipulation': rather than simply anticipating the care that 
her group will provide, a female can induce the helpers to invest more than they otherwise would have by 
producing more offspring. Even though she too must invest more to raise these extra offspring, she gains a 
net benefit due to the extra total contribution she elicits from the other carers as the size of the group 
increases. This female 'manipulation' is not necessarily harmful to the other carers, but this will depend on 
the similarity of their current and future fitness functions to those of the female; in some shorebirds, 
polyandrous females 'manipulate' more males to care for their offspring in a similar way, by producing 
additional clutches sequentially (Lank et al. 1985). From the viewpoint of the helpers, they should always 
respond to additional offspring by increasing investment, because they always benefit from additional 
offspring being reared; combined with the response of the female to predictable help this leads to a close 
positive relationship between group size, offspring number, and total amount of investment by the group.  
In species with less flexible brood sizes, another way for the breeding female to alter initial investment 
would be by manipulating the amount invested in each individual offspring at the production stage according 
to the number of helpers, an effect shown by Russell et al. (2007), Canestrari et al. (2011), and Santos and 
Macedo (2011). This tactic should be expected in species that produce small numbers of offspring, as the 
female will be more heavily constrained by the necessity of producing a discrete number of offspring. For 
example, in a species that normally produces four offspring, the minimum increase (to produce a single extra 
offspring) represents a 25% increase in production investment, whereas a species producing twenty offspring 
is capable of producing an additional one and only raising its costs by 5%. 
In our model, low production costs can lead to individual offspring each receiving less investment when 
helpers are present than they would from a lone female, reproducing a theoretical result found in the 
biparental case by McNamara et al. (2003). In these cases the increase in helper investment only partially 
compensates for the greater number of offspring produced by the female to take advantage of the available 
help. Following this result, we predict that a positive effect of helpers on individual offspring survival and 
success should be more often seen when care is compensatory, but that helpers should cause females to 
increase the number of oﬀspring she produces regardless of the cost parameters. 
We treat all individuals other than the breeding female as equivalent in our model, but in real systems these 
carers will vary in their ability or willingness to deliver care due to factors such as age (and hence 
experience) (Heinsohn & Cockburn 1994; Langen 1996) or relatedness to the brood (leading to different 
indirect benefits) (Emlen & Wrege 1991; Nam et al. 2011; Browning et al. 2012a). Lowering relatedness 
between helpers and offspring should decrease helper investment if indirect benefits are important, and less 
experienced helpers will likely pay higher costs, also leading to reduced investment. However in most 
systems there will be an inverse relationship between relatedness and experience as older individuals are 
more likely to have lived through a change in the breeding pair; this will lead to similarity in the payoff 
functions of helpers as the effects on investment work in opposite directions. The breeding male is a 
potential exception to the above rule as he will normally possess both high relatedness to the brood and 
significant experience, however studies typically indicate that breeding males do follow the same investment 
patterns as non-breeders during offspring rearing (Wright 1998b; McDonald et al. 2009). In our model the 
term that governs how individual payoff is affected by the costs incurred by other group members is referred 
to as 'relatedness', but could equally well represent any direct benefit where an individual's fitness is linked to 
the fitness or survival of other group members. 
Our results suggest that cooperation should evolve more easily when a greater proportion of the costs of 
reproduction can be removed from the breeding female, as this allows more carers to invest effectively in 
offspring. As we have seen, when the female's costs are higher in the production stage the effect of additional 
carers on productivity quickly plateaus, whereas when they are lower the number of offspring produced is 
nearly linear with carer number, at least over the ranges considered. Conversely, the more potential carers 
that are available, the greater the advantage to shifting the earliest point that carers can invest towards the 
beginning of the breeding attempt, thus biasing the 'balance' of the attempt towards rearing costs. This could 
be achieved (for example) by producing young that are smaller and less well developed (assuming they can 
be fed by any individual), by developing mechanisms for other carers to share the costs of guarding or caring 
for eggs, or by provisioning the female during incubation or gestation to transfer away some of her 
production-stage costs. 
Given that the eﬀect of additional carers on female payoﬀ is always positive, help should never be refused by 
the breeding female unless additional factors such as resource competition become important. This means 
that group size is likely to be driven by the relative values of the alternative options available to the other 
carers, especially when ecological factors are not acting to reduce the ﬁtness of larger groups. In many 
systems we would expect there to be a certain payoﬀ below which one or more alternative options (e.g. 
dispersal, ﬂoating, or challenging for breeding) becomes favourable, causing the helper to leave the system. 
Further theoretical work incorporating group formation and outside options would be needed to determine 
stable group sizes in a mixed population of breeders and helpers with varying relatedness. Although our 
model is framed in terms of helpers gaining indirect fitness benefits from offspring, the abstract relationship 
between offspring benefit and helper benefit equally well describes helpers accruing direct fitness benefits, 
provided that these direct benefits are contingent on the success of the breeding attempt in the same way 
indirect benefits would be. For example, the outcomes expected when helpers accrue fitness through 
augmenting group size ﬁt well with our model, as this relies on oﬀspring surviving and contributing to the 
future ﬁtness of the helper. By contrast, our model is less useful for systems where selection for helping is 
based largely on ‘help-for-experience’ (Selander 1964); ‘pay-to-stay’ (Gaston 1978) or ‘social prestige’ 
(Zahavi 1995), because in such systems helper benefits are based on the act (rather than consequences) of 
helping.  
Future empirical studies in pair- and cooperatively-breeding species would beneﬁt from considering the 
mounting evidence that maternal investment can vary significantly according to partner quality (Krist 2011; 
Horváthová et al. 2012) and/or group size (Russell & Lummaa 2009). As with any multi-stage investment 
system, focusing on decisions within individual stages in isolation may produce confusing or contradictory 
results if individuals can shift investment between stages as parameters change, or in response to the 
behaviour of others (Russell et al. 2008). Further theoretical work is needed to understand the effects on 
investment levels of restricted (but non-zero) investment by helpers at early stages. While we have focused 
here on effects of maternal variation in offspring number, one might also expect aspects such as offspring 
size, sex ratio, hatching synchrony and timing of reproduction to influence investment decisions in a 
cooperative group (Russell & Lummaa 2009). 
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